In the first workshop participants examined what is known about the current state of the insurgency, including who the actors are and how the effectiveness of countermeasures by the Iraqi government and coalition forces can be measured. Finally, the process can preempt surprises by anticipating developments before they occur. It includes the group's exploration of possibilities, with a give-and-take that adds richness and nuance that otherwise might be more difficult to achieve. The scenario process exposes and illuminates not simply the views of expert observers, but the assumptions underlying those views and the implications of conditions and uncertainties that might not have been considered. Given the complexity of the insurgency, we recognized the value of having several potential outcomes for which we would evaluate U.S. They considered multiple potential outcomes and the developments that produce them rather than forecasting a single outcome. Instead they focused on plausible developments in underlying forces and trends-in this case over a three- to seven-year period. Participants made no assumptions regarding historical continuity or change. This term refers to factors or forces whose development or impacts are impossible to forecast accurately. Unlike most academic and intelligence analyses-which focus mostly on information known with confidence-scenario analysis focuses on uncertainties. To do this they tried to understand the underlying forces and trends and the uncertainties related to their development and impacts. Participants in the three scenario workshops, held in November 2005, January 2006, and April 2006, sought to anticipate possible outcomes of the insurgency in Iraq. marine secures the rear exit of a residence during a counter-insurgency operation search in the city of Rawah, Iraq, on April 29, 2006. This report broadly outlines the strategies that appear best suited to the current situation and the unfolding futures the participants envisioned.Ī U.S. Unfortunately, the United States is now in a position to influence but not to control outcomes it will have to engage and enlist the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors to attain success. goals and strategies to achieve reduced expectations. The scenarios include recommended adjustments to U.S.1 Avoidance of disaster and maintenance of some modicum of political stability in Iraq are more realistic goals-but even these will be hard to achieve without new strategies and actions. The administration's expressed goal of "an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country" is possible only in the very long term. goals for Iraq and the region should be reexamined and scaled back. The workshops' principal finding is that U.S.These scenarios reflected the participants' perception that positive outcomes would be hard to achieve, and negative outcomes could be foreseen much more easily.
#Iraq insurgency drivers
Three workshops explored hundreds of forces and factors relevant to insurgency outcomes and focused on key drivers to develop five alternative scenarios.
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